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Robert E. Clute*
HE launching of Sputnik I in October of 1957, and subsequent
space achievements which culminated in the moon landings,
introduced a new era with manifold implications for international
relations. The political import of activity in outer space is staggering.
The world community has attempted to establish a legal framework to
regulate activities which might threaten the well-being of this planet
and its national components. Much consideration has been given to
outer space and celestial bodies. Although flights to the moon and
other planets are awe inspiring scientific feats, they are probably not
the most critical problem from the standpoint of regulation of
behavior. Manned trips to the farther reaches of space are presently too
expensive and the material rewards are too small to permit a great deal
of activity. Consequently most deep space flights in the forseeable
future will probably be by means of unmanned craft designed for
scientific exploration by instruments. It is easier, cheaper and safer to
send scientific equipment into space over long periods of time than to
send men. Instrumentation takes less space, can operate on solar
energy, and unlike man, does not require the supplies or environmental
control systems which are expensive to transport and greatly limit the
capabilities of a long-distance mission.
The real volume of space activity which will require intensive
regulatory measures is much less remote than the moon. Most space
activity occurs in the exosphere' and the inner limits of space where it
is possible to place satellites in orbit around the earth. Already such
satellites are in use for communications, meteorology, intelligence
reconnaissance, geodetic surveys, resource surveys and a host of other
activities. Unfortunately, the closer one gets to earth the more difficult
it seems to effect legal controls. As a matter of fact, earthlings seem
to be so busy unraveling the secrets of the galaxy that they have not
succeeded in determining exactly where the earth's atmosphere ends and
outer space begins, a critical delimitation in the formulation of space
law.2
Although the law of outer space is still in a primitive stage of
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.
'he exosphere of the earth's atmosphere is commonly defined as the outer fringe region of
atmosphere, estimated to begin at an altitude of 300 to 600 miles.
'See discussion beginning part V, infra pp. 124-26.
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development with numerous deficiencies, the international community
succeeded in formulating a rather large body of law in an amazingly
short period of time. From the outset the United States insisted that
space activity be utilized for peaceful scientific purposes. In June of
1957, prior to the launching of Sputnik I, the United States first
proposed in the United Nations General Assembly that the U.N. itself
assume the leading role in the cooperative and peaceful development of
outer space.3 The launching of Sputnik I in October of 1957 increased
the impetus for formulating new legal principles. President Eisenhower,
in a letter of January 12, 1958, responding to a message from Soviet
Premier Bulganin, reiterated the need to limit the use of outer space
to peaceful purposes. He reminded Bulganin that a decade before, the
United States had offered to utilize atomic energy for peaceful
purposes only, but the offer had been rejected.' President Eisenhower
continued:
If only that offer had been accepted by the Soviet Union, there
would not now be the danger from nuclear weapons which you
describe. -
The nations of the world face today another choice perhaps more
momentous that that of 1948. That relates to the use of outer space.
Let us this time, and in time, make the right choice, the peaceful
choice.5
This statement was reiterated by the United States, Great Britain and
France, but in a formal reply the Soviet Premier made the prohibition
of military activities in outer space conditional on the liquidation of
all military bases in foreign territories.6
Subsequent direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and the
United States, although more realistic in view of this country's later
accomplishments in outer space, have not resulted in conspicuous
success. Certainly the United Nations has played the most prominent
role in the development of space law and has been the principal entity
in effecting accommodations between the major powers. The small or
medium powers and the developing nations have played an important
part in pressing for the solution of space problems under the auspices
of the United Nations. This effort may be explained in part by a fear
Statement by Sen. Albert Gore, Comm. I of the Seventeenth Gen. Ass. Sess., Dec. 3, 1962,
48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 21, 24 (1963).
'President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin Exchange Correspondence on Proposals for
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of the specter of nuclear warfare in outer space, but is also undoubtedly
connected with the very real benefits which could accrue from a
program geared to the development of outer space for peaceful
purposes. Developing nations are particularly interested in outer space
capabilities which may greatly cheapen the process of economic
development and hasten the process of social change. The concern of
such nations has encouraged the United Nations to provide a forum
and area for study which has kept the problem of space law under
constant surveillance and has exposed the issue to public opinion.
I. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
A detailed treatment of activities of the United Nations on the
subject of outer space is beyond the scope of this work. However,
selected illustrative actions will be sufficient to call attention to the
contribution which the United Nations has made. The first special
agency of the United Nations to deal specifically with space was the
Ad Hoc Committee on The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space created by
a General Assembly Resolution of 1958.1 The Assembly requested the
Committee to report on legal problems which might arise from the
implementation of programs to explore outer space. In December of
1959 the General Assembly by unanimous resolution created the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which has
since that time carried out detailed studies on the legal regulation of
space activities.8 United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
'Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at
5. U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1959). Objectives of the Ad-Hoc Committee were to report on:
(a) The activities and resources of the United Nations, of its specialized agencies
and of other international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;
(b) The area of international co-operation and programmes in the peaceful uses of
outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices
to the benefit of the States irrespective of their economic or social development. .;
(c) The future organizational arrangements to facilitate international co-operation
in this field within the framework of the United Nations;
(d) The nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of
programmes to explore outer space. ...
Id.
'international Co-operation in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1960).
The committee was charged:
(a) To review, as appropriate, the area of international co-operation, and to study
practical and feasible means, for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful uses of
outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations auspices
(b) To study the nature of legal problems which may arise from the exploration of
outer space. . ..
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lauded the creation of the new committee as "'. . . the most substantial
achievement in the 14 years that the United Nations has been in
existence." 9 It does indeed have an impressive record.
In its report to the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee
observed that as a matter of principle, the provisions of the United
Nations Charter and of the Statutes of the International Court of
Justice were relevant to the space activities of nations and were not
limited "to the confines of the earth."' 1 This declaration was
incorporated in the first comprehensive resolution on outer space
presented to the General Assembly by COPUOS. The Report of
COPUOS was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on
December 20, 1961 ."
The resolution affirmed that international law, including the Charter
of the United Nations, was applicable to outer space and celestial
bodies, which were declared to be free for the use or exploration by all
nations and were not to be subject to national appropriation. Member
states were called upon to register the launching of space objects placed
into orbit with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
A resolution, passed by acclamation in the General Assembly on
October 17, 1963, and endorsed by the United States and the Soviet
Union, welcomed the expressions of the United States and the Soviet
Union "not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction .". The
resolution also called on all states:
To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such
weapons in outer space in any other manner .... 1s
Two months later the General Assembly unanimously adopted the
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (The Declaration of Legal
'Speech by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, United Nations Correspondents Ass'n, Dec. 15,
1959, 42 DEP'T STATE BULL. 99 (1960).
"oStatement by Loftus Becker, U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
May 6, 1959,40 DEP'T STATE BULL. 885, 886 (1959).
"International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
'
tQuestion of General and Complete Disarmament, G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp.
IS, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
1Id.
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Principles)" which incorporated much of the material in previous
resolutions and provided the basis and most of the content for the later
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies (the Treaty on Outer Space)." In another resolution during the
eighteenth session, the General Assembly called on COPUOS to
prepare a treaty on liability for damages caused by objects launched
into outer space.' 6 However, this treaty has not yet been completed.'"
The legal effect of General Assembly resolutions has long been
analyzed by writers who have generally agreed that the effect of such
resolutions is somewhat less than that of a treaty. However, the extent
of the obligation imposed by such outer space resolutions, especially
when adopted unanimously, is still a subject of debate. 8
In a previous article" this author noted that in view of the finding of
the Eastern Greenland case 20 the resolution banning nuclear weapons in
outer space2' might be likened to an international agreement binding on
both the Soviet Union and the United States since the resolution was
preceded by statements of officials of both countries that their
governments would not utilize such weapons in outer space. However,
subsequent practice has cast considerable doubt on the binding effect
of General Assembly resolutions. During the drafting of the Treaty on
Outer Space at Geneva in October of 1966, the American delegate, in
speaking of the October 17, 1963, resolution 22 before the Legal Sub-
Committee of COPUOS, declared that his country took the position
that the principles contained therein "constituted international law as
it was accepted by the members of the United Nations . . . ."m The
delegate of the Soviet Union, however, contended that the resolution,
"although a significant step forward, made no provision for accession
"G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
"Jan. 27, 1967, [19671 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as the Treaty on
Outer Space].
"International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1963, 18 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 15, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
171d.
"For a detailed discussion and bibliograph see, Csabafi, The U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions on Outer Space as Sources of Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 331 (1966).
"*Clute, United States Treaty Commitments and Outer Space, in DE LEGE PACTORUM (1969).
"Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,No. 53. An oral commitment
by a Norwegian official in a dispute between Norway and Denmark was held by the court to be a
binding international agreement in the decision in favor of Denmark.
21G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
nid.
1McMahon, Legal Aspects of Outer Space: Recent Developments, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'I L. 416,
418 (1966).
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by all States and was not binding on States. '2 4 The French delegate
concurred in the Soviet view and added that even unanimous
resolutions "could give rise to no legal obligations."" Subsequent
efforts in the development of space law by COPUOS have been
directed mainly toward the drafting of legal principles in treaty form.
Nonetheless, the earlier utilization of General Assembly resolutions
may have been a useful device to arrive at an accommodation in
preparing the way for a definitive treaty. It would certainly have pro-
duced embarrassment and unwelcome publicity for either the Soviet
Union or France to publicly repudiate such a resolution once they had
assented to it.
Subsequent efforts of COPUOS have been concerned with such
matters as the definition of outer space; the utilization of outer space
and celestial bodies, including the various implications of space
communications; " and the drafting of the Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space.Y
II. THE TEST BAN TREATY AND THE TREATY ON OUTER SPACE
An important first step in treaty action and the demilitarization of
outer space occurred with the coming into force of the multilateral
Test Ban Treaty on October 10, 1963.28 By Article I each party accepts
the obligation:
. . . to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapons
test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its
jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere, beyond its limits,
including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or
high seas. . .. 21
The Test Ban Treaty obviously did not ban non-nuclear weapons of
mass destruction as was the case in the General Assembly Resolution
of October 17, 1963. 30 It also did not contain any provisions for
effective inspection to assure compliance. Neither France nor Red
ld.
1id.
nSee generally Report of the Legal Sub-Committee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space on the Work of its Sixth Session, in 6 I NT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1086 (1967).
"April 22, 1968, [1968] 6 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599.
nMultilateral Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under
Water, Oct. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 [hereinafter cited as The Test Ban
Treaty].
uid. at 1316.
"See G.A. Res. 1884. 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
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China were signatories although they possessed nuclear weapons. Both
have since launched objects into outer space. Despite these
shortcomings, the document was an important step in preventing the
nuclear arms race from spreading to outer space.
The Treaty on Outer Space was the first international agreement
devoted solely to the regulation of activities in outer space. It was
passed as a resolution of the General Assembly on December 19, 1967,
was opened for signature on January 27, 1967, and went into force on
October 10, 1967.31 The preamble calls attention to General Assembly
Resolutions 1884 and 1962, but that has no legal effect since a
preamble is not considered to be binding on the signatories. However,
the treaty incorporated Resolution 1962 almost in toto and the two
resolutions make up most of its content.
Article I declares that the exploration and use of outer space
including celestial bodies is to be carried out in the interests of all
countries, and the use and free exploration of outer space and celestial
bodies is to be available to all states on a basis of equality, including
free access to celestial bodies. The signatories are to carry out space
activities in accordance with international law including the Charter of
the United Nations. Article II guarantees that neither outer space nor
celestial bodies are to be subject to national appropriation or claims
of sovereignty.
The provisions regarding "appropriation" give rise to a host of
questions. For instance, does the taking of moon samples by American
astronauts constitute a treaty violation? Would a permanent settlement
or a commercial activity such as a communications installation or
mineral extraction be an appropriation? We now know that there are
no water supplies, forests or other materials on the moon that might
be used in establishing bases on other planets, but how would this
provision effect the taking of such materials from one celestial body
to another celestial body in order to supply such bases or installations
without traversing the long distance to earth?
The parties to the treaty corrected the omission of weapons of mass
destruction in the Test Ban Treaty by agreeing to refrain from orbiting,
installing or stationing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction on celestial bodies or in outer space, in wording almost
identical to resolution 1884, but a paragraph was added which affirms
that celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
prohibits "the establishment of military bases, installations and
3
rrreaty on Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
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fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military maneuvers on celestial bodies .... ,,31
The latter provision has given rise to considerable criticism as it
refers only to celestial bodies and makes no mention of outer space.3
Perhaps both the Soviet Union and the United States were concerned
that such a provision in regard to outer space would interfere with their
military reconnaissance activities since "spy in the sky" satellites have
been utilized by both powers. Reports that the Soviet Union launched
Cosmos 185, 198 and 209 with the object of creating a multiple orbit
bombardment system (MOBS) in orbit about 500 miles above the earth
accentuate the need for such coverage.Y Supposedly, the MOBS was
so designed that nuclear warheads could be stationed in orbit, perhaps
for long periods of time, or be sent up during a crisis for the purpose
of psychological advantage and could be recalled to earth if not used
in the period of crisis. Under the Test Ban Treaty the testing and
development of such a weapon using a dummy warhead would be legal
so long as the device was not equipped with nuclear armaments. It has
also been reported that the Soviet Union has recently tested a "hunter-
killer" satellite which tracked down and destroyed two other Soviet
satellites.3 This testing would likewise appear to be legal so long as
nuclear or other explosives capable of mass destruction were not
utilized in the process. The Treaty also does not speak to nuclear
devices which, although not designed to be weapons, could endanger
outer space or the earth. During a recent space flight a nuclear
generator was left on the moon. Although such a small generator
obviously could not do much damage, it could probably have a serious
contaminating effect if it were to explode in the extremely thin
atmosphere of the moon. The omission of nuclear devices from the Test
Ban Treaty could become serious if scientists solve the problem of
shielding nuclear generators with a material light enough to permit
such generators to power space craft in order to provide a great deal
more power than is now available through solar batteries, fuel cells and
other devices.
During negotiations Article IV of the Treaty on Outer Space created
significant problems because the United States delegation contended
321d., [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 2414.
1See. e.g., Gorove, The Prohibition of National Appropriation in the Outer Space Treaty, 10
ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 177, 177-78 (1968); Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Charac-
terization and Possible Utilization for Peacekeeping, 13 MCGILL L.J. 458,461 (1967).
3N.Y. Times, April 13, 1968, at I, col. 4.
uWashington Post, Dec. 4, 1968, at - col.
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that the term "military installations" was too encompassing and might
be interpreted to include "lunar barracks" or similar installations
essential to peaceful explorations by military personnel.x A savings
clause was therefore added which declared that:
The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment
or facility necessary for the peaceful exploration of the moon and
other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.37
Language such as "any equipment" would seemingly permit the use
of non-weapon type nuclear devices.
The Treaty also contained an article concerning assistance to
astronauts in the event of accident or distress and their return to the
state of registry,3 but this provision was very inadequate. The matter
was later covered by the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer
Space.31 The provisions concerning liability for damages caused by
objects launched into outer space were likewise extremely weak. 4"
COPUOS is now drafting a separate treaty on the subject.
The signatories agree that activities in outer space and on celestial
bodies are to be "guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual
assistance and shall conduct all their activities . . . with due regard to
the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty."" 1
One author has objected to the vagueness of "due regard" and has
questioned the exact meaning of the term.' 2 Supposedly this provision
would cover non-military activities harmful to other states. For
example, reflectors placed in orbit and directed toward the earth could
change periods of light and darkness in a given geographic area and
completely disturb the ecology of such a locale. Weather control from
outer space could likewise change fertile areas into unproductive
deserts. These activities could hardly be considered as having "due
regard to the corresponding interests" of the other parties to the Treaty.
States are also required to conduct activities on the moon, in outer
space and on celestial bodies in a manner which would avoid
UStatement by U.N. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, March 7, 1967, 56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 602, 609 (1967).
rrreaty on Outer Space, art. IV, [19671 3 U.S.T. at 2414.
3id., art. V, [1967) 3 U.S.T. at 2414.
3*Apr. 22, 1968, [1968] 6 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599.
'See Treaty on Outer Space, art. VII, [19671 3 U.S.T. at 2415.
lid.. art. IX, [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 2416.
'
2McMahon, supra note 23, at 420,
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harmful contamination or any adverse environmental changes on the
earth which might be caused by the introduction of non-terrestrial
materials. A state planning an activity which might be harmful
is required to undertake prior consultations with the other signatories.
Any state party to the treaty which believes that such conditions exist
may likewise request international consultations concerning such
activity4. Article IX is concerned with the environmental changes on
the earth, but does not speak to such changes in outer space and
celestial bodies. Accounts of the moon landings note that the lunar
module deposited enough matter in the thin atmosphere to greatly
change its density. The elaborate precautions of the moon flight and
subsequent isolation of returned astronauts exhibit considerable effort
to avoid extra-terrestrial contamination on the earth, but were such
efforts made to prevent terrestrial contamination of the moon? Such
contamination on celestial bodies could greatly change their ecology.
The negotiation of Article X of the Treaty on Outer Space proved
to be difficult because of international agreements which the United
States had made with a number of countries to obtain for space track-
ing facilities. The Soviet delegate proposed that "States Parties to
the Treaty will accord other States Parties to the Treaty conducting
activities relating to the exploration and use of outer space equal
conditions for observing the flight of space objects launched by these
States."" The Soviet delegate explained that if a state had granted
tracking facilities to another state it must also grant tracking facilities
to a third state so requesting. The United States interpreted this to be
an application of the most-favored-nation principle to the agreements
on tracking stations. A number of nations with whom the United
States had such treaties made it clear that they could not agree to such
an obligation. The final draft therefore provided that ". . . Parties to
the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other
States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe
the flight of space objects launched by those States."" The objection
of the United States concerning space tracking agreements was
resolved by the inclusion of a savings clause declaring "[t]he nature of
such opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it
could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States
concerned."
'rlreaty on Outer Space, art. IX, [19671 3 U.S.T. at 2416.
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The delegation of the United States insisted that the Treaty include
provisions covering the reporting of space activities. This article,
however, is not a strong one. Parties are to inform the Secretary
General of the United Nations and the general public "to the greatest
extent feasible and practicable" of the nature, conduct and results of
their activities in outer space. 47 The document does not require the
registration of objects launched into outer space as was provided in the
resolution passed by the General Assembly in December of 1961.u
Registration and reporting is implied but is not mandatory in view of
the use of the phrase "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable."
Thus although the Soviet Union has undoubtedly withheld information
on a number of launchings and other space activities since the signing
of the Treaty, this would not necessarily be a Treaty violation.
The United States maintained that the Treaty should contain
adequate provisions giving the parties to the instrument access to the
equipment and facilities of other parties on celestial bodies. The
delegation of the United States considered this to be one of the most
important provisions in the Treaty as the instrument contained no
other arrangements for inspection to ensure that the provisions
regarding demilitarization, the banning of nuclear weapons and the
prohibition of weapons of mass destruction on celestial bodies would
not be violated. At first the Soviet treaty proposal contained no
provisions for access, but Article XII was finally negotiated to declare
that:
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon
and other celestial bodies shall be open to the representatives of other
States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such
representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected
visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and to avoid
interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited."
Ambassador Goldberg, in explaining this article to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, declared that the term "on a basis of
reciprocity" did not constitute a power of veto. The Ambassador stated
that in the Political Committee of the General Assembly and in the
Legal Subcommittee at Geneva he had given unchallenged, clarifying
statements of this article. He noted:
In these clarifying statements I pointed out that the words "on a basis
"rTreaty on Outer Space, art. XI, [19671 3 U.S.T. at 2418.
"G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at6, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
Irreaty on Outer Space, art. XII, [196713 U.S.T. at 2418.
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of reciprocity" . . . do not import a veto. That is, they do not mean
that State A may visit State B's facilities or installations on a celestial
body only if B asks to visit those of A. On the contrary, "on a basis
of reciprocity" merely states what would be true in any event under
international law. Any party to the treaty has the right to visit
installations of another party on a celestial body-whether or not the
other party chooses to exercise its reciprocal right."
Ambassador Goldberg's interpretation implies that the United States
could have the right to inspect unmanned Soviet space craft which had
landed on the moon and other celestial bodies. This could be very
important from the standpoint of acquiring information on tightly
guarded secrets of Soviet space technology. Article XII makes no
mention of access in space and is only applicable to celestial bodies.
The omission appears to be intentional and prevents access to orbiting
space objects or space -objects in flight. Article XII reflects upon the
advantages of negotiating treaty provisions which may at the time
appear to be somewhat remote from technological capabilities. For
instance, one wonders whether the Soviet Union would have consented
to such an article after American astronauts had successfully explored
the surface of the moon and removed parts from the nearby Explorer
spacecraft.
As early as 1963 the Soviet Union expounded the principle that
"[aIll activities of any kind pertaining to the exploration and use of
outer space should be carried out solely by States." 5' Accordingly,
most provisions are applicable only to states. Article XIII, however,
declares that the treaty provisions are applicable to "the activities of
States Parties to the Treaty . . . whether such activities are carried on
by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States,
including cases where they are carried on within the framework of
international intergovernmental organizations.1 52 This would appear to
exclude applicability of the provisions directly to the United Nations,
but rather to the participating states, in any space activity sponsored
by the former.
Undoubtedly some of the terminology is vague, confusing and at
times greatly weakens the provisions. It also has some conspicuous
gaps such as failure to include proper machinery to arbitrate disputes
"Statement by Ambassador Goldberg, supra note 36, at 608.
'Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., 16 U.N. GAOR, Annexes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.6 (1963). See McDougal, The Emerging Customary Law of Space,
58 Nw. U.L. REv. 618, 628 (1963).
r
2 Treaty on Outer Space, art. XII1, [196713 U.S.T. at 2418-19.
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arising under the Treaty, the lack of a ban on manned military stations
and failure to extend the provisions against military installations,
testing of weapons and military maneuvers on celestial bodies to cover
outer space. Nonetheless, the Treaty is certainly a great
accomplishment in the regulation of outer space. It was a premiere, not
a finale, and has led to other treaty actions which will strengthen the
law of outer space. The most recent instrument to grow out of this
treaty is the agreement regarding the rescue and return of astronauts
and the return of space craft to the launching state.
III. THE RESCUE AND RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS AND SPACE OBJECTS
The General Assembly and COPUOS have been concerned with this
problem since 1962. General Assembly Resolution 19630 called on
COPUOS to arrange for the prompt preparation of draft agreements
on assistance to and return of astronauts and space objects. The
Declaration of Legal Principles, enacted September 13, 1963, noted
that states should regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space
and render them all assistance in the event of an accident, distress or
emergency landing on the high seas or on foreign territory." It likewise
declared that such astronauts should be safely and promptly returned
to the state of their space vehicle's registry. Unfortunately, in
subsequent attempts to draft a treaty in the Legal Subcommittee of
COPUOS, the Soviet Union retreated from the goals of the
Declaration of Legal Principles. For example, during the 1964 session
the Soviet Union insisted that the return of space objects should be
conditional on the fact that the launch had been registered in advance
with the United Nations in accordance with the Declaration of Legal
Principles and that only objects launched for "peaceful purposes"
should be returned.s The Soviet Union also insisted that rescue on the
high seas or in a foreign territory be directed by the launching state.
The Soviet delegation evidently hoped to exclude the return of
reconnaissance space craft, which the Soviets maintained was not a
peaceful activity. Direction of rescue activities evidently centered on the
fact that the launching state, by taking charge of such operations,
might be able to prevent secret technological data from falling into
foreign hands. COPUOS contined to keep the matter under discussion
"G.A. Res. 1963, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
"G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
"See Hall, Rescue and Return of Astronauts on Earth and in Outer Space, 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 197, 202-03 (1969); Soraghan, supra note 33, at 474.
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through 1966 and succeeded in attaining a partial accommodation of
the views of the Soviet Union and the United States in Article V of
the Treaty on Outer Space which proclaims:
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of
mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible
assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on
the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When
astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly
returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the
astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to
the astronauts of other State Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other
States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to
the life or health of astronauts."
The article left something to be desired as it only covered the return
of astronauts and did not speak to the problem of the return of space
objects. The penultimate paragraph was, however, an advance over the
General Assembly's Declaration of Legal Principles for it calls on all
parties to render assistance in outer space and on celestial bodies. The
final paragraph likewise was an addition to the Declaration of Legal
Principles.
The provisions of the Treaty on Outer Space were considered to be
a stopgap measure and COPUOS continued to work on a draft treaty
dealing with the subject. Inclusion of Article V in the treaty was
probably a bit premature, but following the forced landing of Gemini
8 in the Pacific on March 16, 1966, public attention was directed to
the fact that the major powers did not have a space rescue capability.57
Increasing concern over inadequate rescue provisions in the space
program added impetus to the inclusion of this article.
Despite the provisions of Article V, the draft agreement which the
Soviet Union presented to the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS
during June of 1967 was concerned with the rescue of astronauts, but
did not address itself to the return of astronauts or space objects
whereas the draft of the United States treated both return and
assistance.5 In the September, 1967, meeting of COPUOS the Soviet
"rreaty on Outer Space, art. V, [19671 3 U.S.T. at 2414.
'
7Hall, supra note 55, at 199.
"Id. at 204.
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delegate suddenly agreed to discuss both the return of astronauts and
space objects.5 ' A treaty was subsequently agreed upon which received
the unanimous endorsement of the General Assembly on December 19,
1967, was signed on April 22, 1968, and came into force on December
3, 1968. It was entitled The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and The Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space (the Agreement)."
The Agreement deals rather extensively with terrestrial emergencies,
but does not speak very directly or clearly to such situations in outer
space or on celestial bodies. Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that
the Agreement contains no provisions for compensating a party for
expenses incurred in a rescue operation involving outer space or
celestial bodies. Obviously a rescue flight involving celestial bodies
which originates on earth would involve tremendous expenses.
A contracting party which discovers, or even receives information,
that personnel of a space craft are involved in an accident, or are in
distress, or have made an unintended or emergency landing in territory
under its jurisdiction, on the high seas or in any other place not under
the provisions of Article 1, shall notify the launching authority, make
a public announcement and notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. The provisions of this article utilize the term "shall" and are
obviously mandatory.
The terms of Article 2 likewise bind a contracting party to take all
possible steps to rescue and assist the personnel of a spacecraft which
lands in its territory either unintentionally, by accident or under
distress. In such an event the launching party is to assist in effecting a
rescue if such cooperation would contribute substantially to the success
of the mission. In the latter case, operations are to be directed and
controlled by the contracting party in close consultation with the
launching authority.
However, under Article 3, if information is received, or it is
discovered, that personnel of a spacecraft have "alighted" on the high
seas or any other place not under the jurisdiction of any state (which
would presumably mean a celestial body or Antarctica) the parties to
the Agreement "which are in a position to do so . . ." are to render
assistance. This is certainly permissive, not obligatory, and in any event
"Id. at 204-05. Dembling & Arons, The Treaty on Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space
Objects, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 630,640-41 (1968).
"Apr. 22, 1968, [196816 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599 [hereinafter cited as The Agreement].
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would not apply to an object in flight or in orbit in outer space since
the term "alighted" is used."
Article 4 requires any contracting party to "safely and promptly"
return personnel of a spacecraft which has landed on its territory to
the launching authority. The provisions concerning the return of space
objects under Article 5 require that a party who discovers, or receives
information, that a space object or its component parts "returned to
earth" in its territory, or on the high seas, or a place not under the
jurisdiction of a state, is required to notify the launching authority and
the Secretary-General. This does not, of course, cover outer space or
celestial bodies. In an Article V situation, the party to the Agreement
shall upon request of the launching state take such steps "as it finds
practicable" to recover the object or component parts."2 Upon request
of the launching state, such objects or components are to be returned
or held at the disposal of the representatives of the launching authority.
Expenses incurred in the recovery or return of space objects shall be
borne by the launching authority, but the article does not refer to
expenses involved in the rescue of personnel.Y If the contracting party
believes that a space object or its components are hazardous it may so
notify the launching authority which is required to eliminate such
possible danger."
The term "launching authority" is used throughout the Treaty. The
Soviet Union has insisted that treaty provisions in regard to space
activities apply only to states. 5 However, the Agreement does evidence
a compromise in this regard as "launching authority" refers not only
to a state but may refer to an international intergovernmental
organization responsible for launching. However, such an organization
must declare that it accepts the rights and obligations of the Agreement
and a majority of the organization's member states must be parties
both to the Agreement and to the Treaty on Outer Space. It is not clear
under Article 6 how such a declaration should be made in view of the
fact that only states may be parties to the Agreement." Supposedly the
United Nations could make such a declaration in regard to space
objects sponsored by its organization as such as the Thumba rocket
launching facility in India.
"Hail, supra note 55, at 207.
The Agreement, art. 5(2), 119681 6 U.S.T. at 7575.
lDembling & Arons, supra note 59, at 657.
"The Agreement, art. 5(4), [1968] 6 U.S.T. at 7575.
"See McDougal, supra note 5 1.
"See The Agreement, art. 6, [1968] 6 U.S.T. at 7575-76.
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The remaining four articles of the Agreement involve mechanics such
as succession, accession, amendment, withdrawal and depository
arrangements. Like the Treaty on Outer Space, this instrument lacks
any machinery for arbitration of disputes arising under its provisions.
The Agreement simply does not treat many of the details which should
be covered in regard to rescue operations in outer space. Hopefully,
future treaty actions will remedy such omissions.
IV. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY LAUNCHING OBJECTS INTO
OUTER SPACE
As early as 1959 the United States proposed a liability convention.0
Work on the convention was undertaken in the Legal Subcommittee
of COPUOS in 1962. General Assembly Resolution 1963" requested
that COPUOS arrange for the preparation of a draft international
agreement on liability and the draft has been under consideration since
that time. The Declaration of Legal Principles stated that each state
launching objects into outer space and each state that permitted such
objects to be launched from its territory or facility, would be
"internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to its natural
or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the earth,
in air space, or in outer space."" Article VII of the Treaty on Outer
Space incorporated the provisions of the Declaration with few word
changes, but extended liability for damage on the moon and other
celestial bodies.
Ambassador Goldberg in urging approval of the Treaty on Outer
Space before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee admitted that
Article VII was not adequate but found that it at least provided "an
optimum fundamental rule" on the subject. The Ambassador noted
that some of the principal unresolved issues were how costs should be
shared when damages are caused by a space object in which more than
one country participates, how to measure damage applicable to loss of
life, bodily injury and destruction of property, and agreement on the
establishment of a tribunal to adjudicate claims disputes.7
During its twenty-second session in 1967 the General Assembly
passed a resolution calling on COPUOS "to continue with a sense of
"Statement by Peter S. Thacker, Counselor-Disarmament, Science, and Technology, U.S.
Mission to the United Nations in the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sept.
9, 1969, in 61 DEP'T STATE BULL. 340,343 (1969).
u18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
OG.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
'Statement by Ambassador Goldberg, supra note 36, at 611.
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urgency" the preparation of a draft agreement on liability for damage
caused by the launching of objects into outer space and to submit such
a draft not later than the twenty-third session.7 However, COPUOS
continued to deal with the drafting of the agreement through the 1969
session and all matters still have not been resolved. The discussions and
various draft proposals presented by the delegates have raised a number
of intriguing questions. Illustrative examples are: Should a nation be
responsible for damages or injuries sustained by foreign guests who
have been invited to a launch site to witness the launching? Does
liability include responsibility for damage caused by the nuclear
reactors of space objects? Are United Nations members individually
liable for United Nations' space activities beyond the general liability
of the United Nations organization itself T2
However, during the 1969 session the Legal Subcommittee resolved
a number of questions and approved several texts formulated by the
Working Group. Such texts might, of course, be changed before the
final convention is signed and are not law, but they are indicative of
the general vein of the consensus on matters affecting liability. In a
definition of terms, "launching" includes an attempted launching and
"launching state" means either the state which launches or procures
the launching of a space object or the state from whose territory the
object was launched. "Space Object" is also defined to include the
components thereof.73
The launching state would be absolutely liable to compensate for
damages caused by a space object on the surface of the earth and to
aircraft in flight, but unless otherwise provided in the convention, the
launching state could be exonerated from absolute liability only to the
extent that such damage resulted wholly or in part from gross
negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage on the part of the claimant. No exoneration would be granted
for activities which were not conducted in conformity with
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations or the
Treaty on Outer Space.
If damage were caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to
a space object, or to personnel or property on board such an object,
by a space object of another state, the latter would be liable only if the
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report, G.A. Res. 2260, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp.
16at II-12, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968).
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damage were due to its fault. At any rate the provisions of the
convention would not apply to damages caused by a space object to
nationals of the launching state or to foreign nationals who
participated in the operation of a space object from the time of its
launching, or at any stage until its descent, or during any time that they
were in the immediate vicinity of the planned launching or recovery
area at the invitation of the launching state. 4 If two or more states
launched a space object jointly they would be jointly responsible for
any resultant damage. However, agreement could not be reached as to
whether the state whose territory or facility was used for the launching
would be considered as a participant and whether such a state would
be primarily or secondarily liable for resultant damage.
A contracting party which suffered damage, or whose natural or
juridical persons suffered damage, could present a claim to a respondent
state. A state could also present such a claim on behalf of permanent
residents in cases where the state of nationality, or the state in which
damage was sustained, had not presented a claim; however no claim
could be presented in respect of nationals of the respondent.7,
Claims would be presented through diplomatic channels and a
claimant could request a third state to present its claim or represent
its interests in the event that the claimant state did not have diplomatic
relations with the respondent state. Claims would have to be presented
within one year after the claimant had learned of the accident or
identified the respondent state or learned of the facts giving rise to the
claim. The exhaustion of local remedies before the presentation of a
claim would not be required. The claimant could however, pursue a
claim in the courts or tribunals of the respondent but such a claimant
could not pursue a claim under the convention while a claim was being
pursued in such national tribunals or agencies of the respondent.7'
In his statement before COPUOS in September of 1969, Peter S.
Thacker, of the United States Mission to the United Nations,
complained of the inability to reach a final agreement on provisions of
the convention and called attention to certain areas in which agreement
had not been achieved."7 Mr. Thacker contended that most delegates
in COPUOS, except for the Eastern European countries, had
maintained that where a claimant and the launching state had not been




"Statement by Peter S. Thacker, supra note 67, at 341-42.
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matter should be turned over to impartial binding arbitration to avoid
lengthy bilateral negotiations. As in previous treaties, the Soviet Union
was hesitant to allow international organizations to acquire rights
under the convention. Part of this reluctance became involved in
questions relating to secondary liability of member states on an
international organization for damages caused by a space object
launched under the auspices of an international organization. Such
matters might effect the United Nations and European organizations
such as ESRO78 and ELDO.1' Another problem has been whether or
not a monetary ceiling should be placed on the amount of damages for
which a respondent state would be liable. Finally, there has been some
controversy as to the applicable law that should govern measure-of-
damages questions. Initially the United States favored an international
law standard but later put forth a compromise of "international law,
taking into account the law of the claimant State." The Indian
delegation proposed a draft based on many of the matters agreed upon
within the Legal Subcommittee which contained compromises on most
of the above mentioned disagreements. Mr. Thacker seemed to think
that the Indian draft could solve disagreements, but as yet no definitive
draft has been accepted.
V. WHAT IS OUTER SPACE?
Perhaps one of the most startling shortcomings of space law is the
fact that the world community has not been able to define where outer
space begins. It is universally recognized that a nation has sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory. This principle is affirmed in both
the Paris Convention of 1919" and the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation of 1944. 1 The problem arises as to where
airspace ends and outer space begins. The exosphere or outer
atmosphere of the earth has very low air density, but there are some
atmospheric gases. Loftus Becker, former Legal Advisor to the
Department of State, once noted that the earth's atmosphere extends
10,000 miles above its surface.82 The Dictionary on Technical Terms
for Aerospace Use states that estimates of the distance to which the
atmosphere extends above the earth vary from five hundred to one
"European Space Research Organization.
"European Organization of the Development and Construction of Space Vehicle Launches, also
known as EUROLAUNCH.
*Oct. 13, 1919, art. I, II L.N.T.S., 174.
"Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1,61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591.
'Statement by Loftus Becker, Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics, May 14,
1958, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 962,966 (1958).
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thousand kilometers.8' The Chicago Convention defined aircraft as all
machines which can be supported in the atmosphere from the reaction
of the air. This definition caused some writers to contend that airspace
should be limited to the height at which aeronautical aircraft can no
longer perform." The development of the X-15 further compli-
cated matters as the craft can fly in either air or space.85 One
writer has suggested that the exosphere should be treated in a manner
similar to the contiguous zone in the law of the sea." Other scholars
maintain that nations have not considered orbiting satellites to be a
violation of airspace and a custom has developed whereby outer space
begins at the lowest point at which a satellite may be kept in orbit.,7
This also presents problems as such a height would greatly depend on
the new technological developments in power for satellites and the
development of materials which would resist burning in the earth's
atmosphere.
In truth there does not seem to be any agreed upon boundary
between the atmosphere and outer space. This is lamentable because
most of the activity in outer space occurs precisely in this debatable
area. The General Assembly asked COPUOS to formulate a definition
of outer space and the matter was placed on the agenda of the Legal
Subcommittee" ' but work did not get under way during the 1969
session.
Admiral Haley has stated that it is neither possible nor necessary to
place a rigid boundary line between airspace and outer space and that
any attempt to do so "partakes of casuistry." 8' The author is inclined
to disagree. An examination of history reveals demarcations which,
although plausible at the time, looked quite ridiculous in view of later
technological developments and knowledge. Examples of such
delineations are the three mile limit for territorial seas which was the
uNASA DICTIONARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS FOR AEROSPACE USE 103 (W. Allen ed. 1965).
"See, e.g., A. HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT, ch. 4 (1963).
uSee NASA, X-15: RESEARCH AT THE EDGE OF OUTER SPACE (NASA E P-9, 1964). The X-
15 flies like a plane in the atmosphere and like a Mercury capsule in space. On August 22, 1963,
it reached an altitude of 354,200 feet for twenty seconds, topping 99.996% of the earth's
atmosphere.
MBing Chen, International Law and High Altitude Flights: Balloons, Rockets and Man Made
Satellites, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SPACE EXPLORATION: A SYMPOSIUM, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 145 (1961).
3Soraghan, supra note 33, at 469.
"G.A. Res. 2453 B, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
"
1A. HALEY, Survey of Legal Opinion on Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
SPACE EXPLORATION: A SYMPOSIUM, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 719, 722 (1961).
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distance a cannon could be shot in Bynkershoek's day or the Papal
Demarcation which supposedly divided South America equally between
Portugal and Spain. Technological developments could likewise
outmode any demarcation of airspace. Although such a boundary
would certainly be somewhat arbitrary, the author favors such a
delineation. If any agreed upon boundary lasted as long as the three
mile limit did in maritime law, it would be well worthwhile in easing
tensions and adding more certainty to law of outer space and could
undoubtedly be revised at some later date.
Vt. AREAS IN WHICH SPACE LAW NEEDS DEVELOPMENT
In addition to defining outer space and clarifying the law of liability
there are a number of areas in which law is either practically non-
existent or inadequate. Some of these were noted during the 1969
meeting of COPUOS. The Legal Subcommittee agreed to examine
questions relating to legal rules governing man's activities on the moon
and other celestial bodies. Article VII of the Treaty on Outer Space
declares that a state under whose registry an object has been launched
into outer space retains jurisdiction over the object and the personnel
thereof in outer space and on celestial bodies. However, this does not
provide guidelines on specific activities or situations such as relations
between astronauts of different nations on a celestial body, detailed
regulations on contamination and a host of other activities. During the
1969 session of the Legal Subcommittee, Mr. R.E. Butler, Deputy
Secretary of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
called attention to the fact that improper use of radio frequencies could
very well interfere with proper command signals to a space object and
could damage its flight or launching. Mr. Butler did not rule out the
fact that such interference could inadvertently come from radio
facilities within the launching state."
At the Vienna Conference on Outer Space, August 14-27, 1968, the
report on meteorology noted:
It is becoming increasingly clear that the problem of weather
modification is passing from an era of intellectually undisciplined
speculation of more or less opportunistic field experimentation into an
era of rational, organized inquiry which will permit the exploration
of an almost unlimited array of deliberate interventions in natural
atmospheric conditions."
"Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report, supra note 72, app. III, at 79.
111d. at 59.
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The legal, economic and sociological implications of such deliberate
large-scale weather manipulation and modification obviate the
necessity of legal regulation.
Communications activities in outer space will likewise necessitate
new laws governing such matters. Communications satellites are
already in use for television and telephone transmission. They may also
be used for telegraph, radio, facsimile and data transmission. Intelsat
II has a capacity for 1,200 two-way telephone voice circuits. Intelsat
III which is to go into operation in the 1970's will have a capacity five
times as large as its predecessor, although it will probably not cost
over twice as much as Intelsat 11.12 Such satellite systems offer tre-
mendous possibilities for economical communications to developing
countries which have not already constructed expensive domestic
communications systems. Agreements providing for pre-investment
studies to create Inter-American93 and Inter-African 4 tele-
communications networks were signed in Washington and entered into
on August 7, 1969, and October 9, 1969, respectively. Such systems
also could revolutionize education by offering low cost educational
television facilities to areas lacking education facilities. COPUOS has
been studying the question of direct broadcast satellites. Presently,
signals must be transmitted to earth and retransmitted to other
television stations. The COPUOS study reports that by 1985
communications satellites will probably have sufficient power and
facilities to make direct broadcasts to augmented home television
receivers.' 5 It is estimated that the cost of equipping existent home
receivers to receive such direct programs would cost somewhere
between $40 and $270 per set. Direct television broadcasts from
satellites would undoubtedly motivate many states to demand extensive
control and regulation of telecasting.
Under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962" the United States
created a global Commercial Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which
was open to all members of the International Telecommunications
Union. Thus far, most countries of the world desiring to participate in
"Address by John A. Johnson, 61st Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law,
1967 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 27 (1967).
3Pre-investment Study for the Inter-American Telecommunications Network, July 28, 1969,
- U.N.T.S. - For a complete text, see 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 959 (1969).
UU.N. Development Programme-African Development Bank: Agreement on Executing Special
and Projects, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 258 (1969).
"Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., supra note 51, Annex IV, at
87-88.
"Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1964).
1970]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
such a program have become signatories except the Communist
nations. Controlling stock in the corporation is owned by the
government of the United States. Although the Act states that the
Corporation "will not be an agency or establishment of the United
States Government, ' 97 it is certainly dominated by the United
States. 8 Under an Interim Agreement signed at Washington in 1964"
the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
(INTELSTAT), which had 63 members as of December 18, 1968, was
created. Under the provisions of the Communications Satellite Act
such activities are under the partial control of the Federal
Communications Commission which presents some jurisdictional
problems between the international program and American statutory
requirements.'" The problem is compounded by the fact that the
Interim Agreement is an executive agreement, not a treaty, so it does
not supersede the provisions of the congressional act providing for
certain FCC controls."'1 Meanwhile the Soviet Union, Eastern
European communist countries and some European writers have
condemned this system which is dominated by United States control.
The Soviet Union has submitted a proposal to COPUOS on August
5, 1968, for the establishment of a communications satellite system
entitled Intersputnik which in contrast to the system controlled by the
United States would operate on the basis of one nation, one vote. 02
The increased activity in the area of communications, plus the fact
that all space activities are in the final analysis dependent on the proper
control of communications frequencies, has caused the ITU to call an
International Conference for June 7, 1971, in order to discuss the
necessary technical and regulatory requirements which should be
adopted in the telecommunications field, not only in regard to outer
space, but also in regard to such matters as civil aviation and maritime
problems of communication and navigation.'0
Another province of space law which has not been defined is the legal
"Id. at § 73 1.
"Throop, Some Legal Facets of Satellite Communication, 17 AM. U.L. REV. 12, 20 (1967).
"The Satellite Act itself subjects COMSAT to governmental supervision which is probably more
pervasive than that exercised over any other private corporation in the United States . Id.
at 13.
"Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communication
Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646.
''Ihroop, supra note 98, at 22-32.
111d. at 23.
"Draft "Intersputnik" Agreement, 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1365 (1968).
'"Comm. on the Peaeful Uses of Outer Space, Report, supra note 72, app. I ll, at 80.
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status of satellites used for reconnaissance and espionage purposes.
Until 1963 Soviet writers contended that such activities were not
designed for "peaceful purposes" and were therefore illegal. But since
the Soviet Union has developed its own satellites for such purposes, the
Soviet government has been silent on the matter. Some writers have
interpreted this acquiescence as a customary basis for legalizing such
procedures.'" Indeed a strong case could be made that such activities
were for "peaceful purposes" as they provide inspection, appraise arms
capabilities and thus ease world tensions. No positive law exists on the
matter. The volume of such activities is suggested by a report of George
C. Wilson of August 6, 1968, that the Soviet Union had launched
Cosmos 234 which was its one hundredth reconnaissance or spy
satellite.105 The October 17, 1966, issue of Newsweek reported that
General Electric had been permitted to announce that in the last eleven
years that there had been 121 successful recoveries of film capsules
from American satellites out of 123 "opportunities."'"
The above-mentioned are illustrative, not exhaustive, of the vast
areas in which there is little or no regulation of functional activities.
Numerous other activities such as earth resource surveys, geodetic
surveys, meteorological satellites, satellites designed to serve as
navigational aids for terrestrial aviation or marine activity and myriad
other space projects will require increased regulation by the
international community.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Progress in the development of a positive law of outer space has been
considerable. However, a closer examination of some of the
international agreements concerned indicates that such instruments
often contain shockingly vague terminology and avoid making a
determination on areas which are very germane to the subject being
treated but could not be politically accommodated within the treaty.
Undoubtedly such agreements have been concluded on the premise that
a vague or inadequate agreement is better than no agreement at all.
With this the author would agree. Such treaties, however, could lull the
public forum into a false sense of security and remove some of the
urgency for developing space regulations. Existent treaties provide
practically no functional regulation of the numerous space activities
''Soraghan, supra note 33, at 463-73.
'"Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1968, p. - col.
'"White, A New Political Frontier: An Analysis of Legal and Political Problems in Outer
Space, 22 W. POL. Q. 163,171 n.31 (1969).
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and the increased traffic in outer space. Unless the international
community is able to increase the regulation of this expanded volume
of activity, outer space utilization may become mired in a chaos of
disorderly confusion and hazards which could have harmful effects on
the world and space development.
